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Understanding	the	rise	of	the	populist	establishment
Studies	of	populism	have	traditionally	focused	on	the	politics	of	opposition,	such	as	protest	movements
and	the	campaigns	of	smaller	parties.	But	as	Zsolt	Enyedi	notes,	recent	election	results	have
demonstrated	that	populist	parties	cannot	only	win	power,	but	also	show	a	surprising	level	of	resilience
when	they	enter	government.	He	argues	that	populism	can	no	longer	be	regarded	simply	as	a	symptom
of	the	dysfunction	of	institutions:	populists	need	to	be	appreciated	as	institution	builders.
Populism	–	whether	conceived	as	ideology,	organisational	strategy,	a	form	of	mobilisation,	or	discourse	–	is	typically
analysed	in	the	context	of	protest	movements	and	minor	parties.	Populist	government	receives	less	attention,	and	if	it
does,	the	discussion	tends	to	be	based	on	ideal-types	or	on	the	extrapolation	of	trends	observed	within	the
opposition	circles	of	liberal	democracies.
Now	that	we	can	see	populists	in	power	in	an	increasing	number	of	countries,	we	need	to	reconsider	the	anti-
establishment	nature	of	populism.	The	two	expressions,	that	is	‘populist’	and	‘anti-establishment’,	are	often	used	as
synonyms,	even	in	the	context	of	those	Latin	American	countries	in	which	presidents	frequently	campaign	on	an	anti-
establishment	ticket.	The	association	between	the	two	concepts	is	even	stronger	in	Europe	and	in	the	US,	where
populist	forces	used	to	be	marginal	and	oppositional.	Well,	they	are	no	more.	From	Italy	to	Hungary,	or	from	Poland
to	the	United	States,	we	now	see	how	populists	in	government	translate	their	ideas	into	policies.
While	removing	anti-elitism	from	the	definition	of	populism	would	deprive	the	term	of	much	of	its	analytical	value,	we
need	to	take	some	of	the	caveats	more	seriously	than	in	the	past.	First,	since	typically	the	populist	elements	are	part
of	a	larger	ideological	package,	the	undifferentiated	rejection	of	all	elites	is	rare.	Second,	the	veneration	of	the
people,	often	considered	as	a	hallmark	of	populists,	can	coexist	with	deep	scepticism	concerning	their	competence
(Trump	famously	wondered	how	stupid	the	people	of	Iowa	can	be).
Even	more	importantly,	the	negative,	transitory,	disruptive	and	insurgent	character	of	populism	is	more	a	product	of
historical	happenstance	than	a	consequence	of	the	populist	DNA.	After	the	Second	World	War,	populists	faced	a
largely	content	and	deferential	electorate	in	much	of	the	developed	world.	The	talent	of	their	leaders,	their
organisational	capacity	or	their	internal	discipline	fell	short	of	the	challenges	they	needed	to	meet,	and	therefore	they
could	not	reach	much	further	than	to	temporarily	disrupt	the	well-oiled	machinery	of	welfare	states	and	liberal
democracies.
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Today	the	citizens	opposed	to	the	mainstream	liberal-democratic	agenda	on	economic	and	political	integration,	on
migration	or	on	the	way	minority-concerns	must	be	treated	in	the	mass	media,	constitute	a	support	base	that	is	large
enough	to	make	the	populist	strategy	of	taking	over	government	viable.	The	viability	of	the	enterprise	attracts	the
type	of	people	that	populists	missed	so	far:	donors,	campaign	managers,	lawyers,	and	in	general	government
insiders	who	know	how	much	of	the	liberal	regime	was	real,	backed	up	by	actual	commitments	and	resources,	and
how	much	of	it	was	simply	an	informal	and	shallow	elite	consensus;	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	technocrats	of
populism:	hot	air.
Populist	power,	to	the	extent	it	stays	democratic,	is	fragile,	because	of	its	inexperience	and/or	unwillingness	to
aggregate	partial	social	interests	and	because	of	its	opposition	to	the	pre-existing	practices	of	governance.	But	the
inhibitions	that	constrain	other	political	actors	from	using	norm-breaking	methods	for	keeping	governmental	power	do
not	apply	to	populists,	and	therefore	they	can	be	surprisingly	resilient	in	office.
Naturally,	populists	need	to	change	once	in	government.	Primarily,	they	need	to	redefine	the	opponent	so	that	the
actual	government	and	the	parliamentary	majority	are	excluded	from	the	definition.	The	alternatives	are	many:
international	actors,	foreign	nations,	social	and	cultural	elites,	Freemasons,	Jews,	business	elites,	the	deep	state,
European	bureaucracy,	etc.	There	is	no	shortage	of	powerful	actors	against	whom	a	national	prime	minister	or
president	can	be	presented	as	an	underdog.	And	since	in	the	fight	against	such	Goliaths	the	populist	politician	needs
all	the	support	he	can	get	at	home,	the	hierarchical	and	punitive	aspects	of	domestic	governance	inevitably	need	to
be	enhanced.
The	established	position	of	populist	parties	also	means	that	their	supporters	will	change.	It	is	customary,	for	example,
to	measure	populist	attitudes	through	negative	sentences	about	politicians.	But	in	countries	governed	by	populists,
the	opponents	of	the	populists	are	more	likely	to	agree	with	such	statements.	Researchers	need	measurement	tools
that	are	sensitive	to	how	the	populist	establishment	defines	its	enemies	in	order	to	understand	why	people	keep
supporting	such	governments.
The	Hungarian	and	the	Polish	cases	show	that	effective	and	relatively	stable	populist	governance	requires	the
frequent	change	of	specific	rules	of	politics	and	business	and	the	creation	of	an	uneven	playing	field	through	the
carefully	calibrated	redistribution	of	resources.	Both	regimes	have	repressive	elements,	but	they	do	not	imprison
critical	citizens,	do	away	with	freedom	of	speech	or	abolish	the	formal	structures	of	liberal	constitutionalism.	They
preserve	their	populist	heritage	by	using	a	Manichean	discourse	to	rally	the	people	against	the	‘foreign-hearted’
factions	of	the	elites	and,	whenever	possible,	by	weakening	the	mechanisms	that	could	constrain	the	parliamentary
majority.	This	discourse	is	compatible	with	responsible	fiscal	policies	and	effective	law-and-order	measures.
It	is	also	important	to	acknowledge	that	while	the	antagonism	of	the	populist	establishment	to	constitutional
democracy	and	to	the	division	of	power	is	undeniable,	its	hostility	towards	party	pluralism	is	less	obvious.	Sure,	there
are	many	instances	when	the	populists	in	government	speak	as	if	they	were	identical	with	the	people	but	even	more
often	they	acknowledge	that	they	exist	in	a	legitimately	fragmented	political	space.	Fidesz	and	PiS	(or	AKP	in	Turkey
and	PAIS	in	Ecuador)	originally	won	their	power	through	fair	party	competition,	and	although	subsequently	they
invested	considerable	energy	into	making	this	competition	less	fair,	they	are	comfortable	with	the	practices	and
rituals	of	electoral	competition.
The	very	fact	that	there	are	examples	of	populists	operating	and	reforming	states	in	an	systematic	fashion	casts
doubts	on	those	approaches	in	the	literature	that	emphasise	the	anti-institutional	and	un-institutionalised	character	of
populism.	Populism	can	no	longer	be	regarded	simply	as	a	symptom	of	the	dysfunction	of	institutions.	Populists	need
to	be	appreciated	as	institution	builders.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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His	recent	publications	on	this	topic	include	contributions	to	the	edited	volumes	European	Populism	in
the	Shadow	of	the	Great	Recession,	Absorbing	the	Blow:	The	Impact	of	Populist	Parties	on	European
Party	Systems,	and	Trumping	the	Mainstream:	The	Conquest	of	Mainstream	Democratic	Politics	by
Far-Right	Populism,	as	well	as	articles	in	the	Journal	of	Political	Ideologies,	Problems	of	Post-
Communism,	and	the	Journal	of	Democracy.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Understanding the rise of the populist establishment Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-07-04
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/04/understanding-the-rise-of-the-populist-establishment/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
